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The wisdom of the crowd is a valuable asset in today’s society. It is
not only important in predicting elections but also plays an essential role
in marketing and the financial industry. Having a trustworthy source
of opinion can make forecasts more accurate and markets predictable.
Until now, a fundamental problem of surveys is the lack of incentives
for participants to provide accurate information. Classical solutions like
small monetary rewards or the chance of winning a prize are often not
very attractive for participants. More attractive solutions, such as pre-
diction markets, face the issue of illegality and are often unavailable. In
this work, we present a solution that unites the advantages from clas-
sical polling and prediction markets via a customizable incentivization
framework. Apart from predicting events, this framework can also be
used to govern decentralized autonomous organizations.
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1. Introduction
Sentiment in its broadest sense, is of great interest to both politics and industry. In
the USA alone, the revenue of market research and public opinion polling reached
$18B in 2016 and continues to grow [1]. In spite of its size, political forecasts have
failed to accurately predict two major recent political events, the US presidential
elections and the decision of the UK to leave the EU [2, 3]. These failures may
come as a surprise as, with the emergence of social networks and generally more
interactive website, it has never been easier to source the opinion of the crowd.
In the financial industry, rating agencies are highly-paid providers of sentiment
on a wide range of investment vehicles. However, if one takes for example a popular
US stock such as TESLA, on Oct 13, 2017 out of 25 analysts, 35% recommended
buy, another 35% recommended hold and the remaining 30% recommended sell [4].
Therefore, making the prediction no better than a simple guess [5]. Another well
document fact is that most actively managed funds fail to beat the market, showing
again that so-called expert opinions are not as valuable as they may seem [6, 7].
A common feature of the above cases is that repercussions (and rewards) for pro-
viding inaccurate (accurate) sentiment are extremely limited for both individuals,
such as experts, and the crowd. For experts, this is not at last due to the diffi-
culty of objectively evaluating their performance. Reasons include the phenomenon
of survival bias, i.e. only the experts that made good predictions are cited, and
also, if the expert is influential enough, the ability of turning ones prediction into
a self-fulfilling prophecy. For crowd sentiment, some opinion polls offer small mon-
etary rewards, usually in the form of a lottery, for filling out a survey. However,
these rewards are paid irrespectively of the quality of the provided sentiment and
in particular does not prevent anyone from intentionally providing false statements.
Furthermore, specifically in web surveys, participants are able to repeatedly reply
to the same surveys to increase their potential reward.
A different form and an arguably significantly more successful approach of infor-
mation aggregation are speculative markets [14–21]. There, free bidding markets
of outcome shares are offered and, dictated by economic theory, share prices will
become representative of the likelihood of an event coming true. Unfortunately, un-
der most legislations (in particular in the US), speculative markets are considered
gambling and thus illegal - making this option often unavailable.
In the present article, we introduce a framework that unites the legal benefits
of classical polling with the predictive power of speculative markets by introducing
pre-defined reward functions whose payouts are both fixed and performance based.
The structure of this article is as follows: At first, we introduce the Sentiment
Protocol in Section 2. The section starts with a high level overview and is followed
by a detailed description of each component. Each stage includes basic examples
that illustrate the respective concepts. In Section 3, we analyze the incentives for
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sentiment contributors and pollsters. We also discuss possible vulnerabilities and
give suggestions on how they may be overcome. In the final Section 4, we discuss
in further detail two use cases for the Sentiment Protocol.
2. The sentiment protocol
It is now widely accepted that blockchain technology, the underlying concept of
Bitcoin [9], has the ability to disrupt a wide range of industries including finan-
cial services, technology, media and telecommunications [11, 12]. Arguably, one of
the most revolutionary emerging concepts are so-called smarts contracts which are
scripts executed on a world spanning super computer [13]. The Sentiment Protocol
leverages these new possibilities to on the one hand immutably record provided
sentiment and on the other hand conduct monetary transactions, such as rewards
or penalties, without the need of trusting a third party.
The novelty of the protocol is that it leverages the predictive power of speculative
markets while retaining the legality of classical polling. This goal is achieved by
introducing a performance based reward function fPE (cf. Section 2.4), resulting in
higher payouts for better predictions, with a reward pool provided by the pollster.
Since the pollster takes a distinguished role, speculative risks are taken away from
the sentiment contributors.
Whenever the performance based reward function fPE only takes non-negative
values, participants can only earn rewards. Recalling that by definition gambling
is “the act of risking money, or anything of value, on the outcome of something
involving chance” [10], it is clear that in the absence of a risk of loss, the sentiment
protocol cannot be considered gambling. If the performance based reward function
can also attain negative values, participants can loose part of their invested stake,
making it more similar to classical prediction markets.
Protocol overview
The Sentiment Protocol (cf. Figure 1) has three main components:
1. Sentiment Contribution Period,
2. Tallying and
3. Performance Evaluation.
During the Sentiment Contribution Period, users (sentiment providers) can submit
their sentiment to the protocol. At the end of the Sentiment Contribution Period,
and after a cool-down period ∆T0 has lapsed (which may be 0), votes are tallied.
The polling results can either be used for purely informational purposes or, in the
use case of decentralized governance (cf. Section 4.1), directly trigger the policy
2
2.1 Topic and outcome set
that was voted on. After another cool-down period ∆T1 (which may again be 0),
users receive a (possibly negative) performance based reward.
T
Sentiment Contribution Tallying Performance Evaluation
User
∆T0 ∆T1
stake (partially) return stake reward
Figure 1: Overview of the Sentiment Protocol (with penalties).
Setting up a poll
To set up a poll, the creator needs to provide the following:
1. Topic and set of possible outcomes → Section 2.1
2. Staking parameters → Section 2.2
3. Information on usage of results → Section 2.3
4. Performance evaluation parameters → Section 2.4
2.1. Topic and outcome set
The creator of the poll has complete freedom over the choice of topic and also the
set of possible outcomes O. Outcomes can be discrete, such as multiple choice, or
continuous, such as real numbers. The creator also has the option of using a public
key encryption scheme for the submission of sentiment. By doing so, third parties
are prevented from obtaining knowledge of the already submitted sentiment.
Example 1 (Discrete Outcome set O). The poll wants to predict the outcome of
the 2020 US presidential election. The outcome set is O = {R,D}, where R is the
republican and D the democratic candidate.
Example 2 (Continuous Outcome Set O). The poll aims to predict the perfor-
mance of the TESLA stock from 2017-11-01 to 2018-05-01. The outcome set is
O = [0,∞) and O ∋ o = p(2018−05−01)
p(2017−11−01)
, where p is the price of TESLA at a given date.
2.2. Providing sentiment by staking
To provide sentiment, each participant needs to stake a corresponding amount of
assets. For simplicity, we focus on the typical use case where the user needs to stake
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2.2 Providing sentiment by staking
an ERC-20 token into the polling smart contract. The set of possible sentiments
S ⊂ P(O) is a subset of the powerset of the outcome set O.12
During the sentiment contribution period any participant that holds the token
required for staking can submit his sentiment s ∈ S. The weight of the vote is directly
proportional to the number of tokens submitted, i.e. 1 Token = 1 Sentiment.
The setup of the staking phase requires:
• Token type
• Sentiment Contribution Period
• Limits on total submissions
Having to commit tokens with each choice limits the amount of sentiment each
participant can submit. Furthermore, in cases where the performance evaluation (cf.
Section 2.4) can lead to penalties, the commitment of tokens exposes the provider
to a financial risk. It is important to note that each staked token has equal weight
in the sentiment contribution process. In particular, the rewards and/or penalties
are directly proportional to the amount of tokens staked. This choice is due to
the pseudonoymous nature of blockchain, where it is futile to limit sentiment per
address. However, each pollster is free to use a custom staking token. Such a
custom token could for instance be issued by the polling company and may have
restrictions on transferability. Even in cases where no penalty is possible, obtaining
a large amount of staking tokens puts the buyer at the volatility risk of the token
price. Moreover, even if contributors are willing to accept the volatility risk, as
a major stakeholder, they would have little interest in a behaviour that would
undermine the polling process.
Once the Sentiment Contribution Period has ended and a time ∆T0 (which may be
0) has lapsed, the votes are tallied. If the votes were encrypted, the pollster will have
to use his private key to encrypt the submissions. If the performance evaluation does
not involve penalties, the stake is returned to the sentiment provider. If penalties
are possible, the stake minus the maximal possible penalty is returned.
Example 3 (Staking without penalties). Let us return to the previous example of
the 2020 presidential election and assume that no penalties are possible. We set
∆T0 = 24h, S =O = {R,D} and choose the following staking parameters:3
• Type: ETH,
• Sentiment Contribution Period: 2017-12-01 to 2017-12-10,
• Limits on total submissions: Minimum 1000 ETH (1000 Sentiment) and
maximum 10,000 ETH (10,000 Sentiment).
1 Recall, that the powerset P(O) of a set O is the set of all subsets of O. 2 For the technical
reader: if O is continuous we are using the Borel sigma algebra σ(O) instead of P(O). 3 For
the technical reader: we identify {{R},{D}} ≅ {R,D}.
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2.3 Usage of results
Thus, a sentiment provider who wants to provide 100 Sentiment for the democratic
candidate D needs to submit 100 ETH together with his (possibly encrypted) choice
D to the polling smart contract.4 Since no penalties are possible, 100 ETH are
returned to the sentiment provider on 2017-12-11.
2.3. Usage of results
Apart from simply aggregating information on behalf of the pollster, one could also
link the execution of certain events to the results of the tally. For instance, one
could ask individuals to estimate their energy consumption and, if it is below a
certain threshold, a power plant could be idled. If individuals report inaccurate
information they could be penalized by either not earning rewards or by loosing
some of their stake. Another – often controversial – use case are decentralized
autonomous organizations [8]. In this case, the polling results could be used to
autonomously implement policy changes within the organization (cf. Section 4.1).
2.4. Performance Evaluation
The payment of performance based rewards is a key feature of the Sentiment Pro-
tocol. The distribution of rewards/penalties is determined by the performance
evaluation function provided by the poll creator.
Definition 1 (Performance evaluation function fPE ). The performance evaluation
function fPE ∶ O × S → [ − 1,∞), depends on the outcome o ∈ O and the submitted
sentiment s ∈ S and specifies the reward/penalty per submitted token.5
The supremum6 of the performance evaluation function determines the size of
the reward pool that needs to be provided to set up the poll. It is given by
(reward pool) = supfPE ⋅ (limit on total submissions),
where all values are in units of tokens. If fPE ≥ 0 (as a function), the poll does not
involve penalties and thus the stake is returned immediately after tallying. If fPE
takes negative values, (1+ inf fPE) ⋅T tokens are returned after tallying, where T is
the number of submitted tokens.
Once the performance evaluation time is reached (∆T1 after tallying), the rewards
are determined and payed out to the sentiment providers. Any remaining balance
in the reward pool is returned to the pollster. See also Appendix A for an extension
of the protocol that allows multiple performance evaluations.
4 For the technical reader: the user needs to encrypt the value with a nonce and also submit the
encrypted nonce. 5 The technical reader may have noticed that the triple (O,S, fPE) is remi-
niscent of a probability space. Of course, this is not a coincide. 6 If ∣O∣ <∞, sup fPE =max fPE.
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2.4 Performance Evaluation
Example 4 (Constant fPE ). In this trivial case fPE ≡ c for some positive constant
c ∈ R+. Thus, the reward is independent of both the provided sentiment and the
outcome. Assuming the same staking parameters as in Example 3, the reward
pool is 10,000 ⋅ c and, since the reward is independent of the outcome or sentiment,
there is no need to wait (∆T1 = 0) and all sentiment providers receive (1 + c)T
tokens on 2017-12-11, where T is the number of submitted tokens. This trivial case
corresponds to the current practice of most polling companies.
Example 5 (Positive fPE for discrete O). We return to Example 3. To incentivize
sentiment providers to make good predictions we define
fPE(D,D) = fPE(R,R) = c and fPE(D,R) = fPE(R,D) = 0.
Thus, only people that voted for the winning candidate get rewarded. Since the
results of the elections will not be finalized until mid November 2020, ∆T = 1071
days. As in Example 4, the reward pool is 10,000 ⋅ c.
Example 6 (fPE for continuous O). We return to Example 2 and use the same
staking parameters as in Example 3. The sentiment set is S = {buy, sell} and we
wish to choose fPE such that providers of buy ratings get rewarded for a positive
development of the TESLA stock price (o > 1) and penalised for a negative de-
velopment.7 Similarly, providers of sell ratings shall get rewarded for a negative
development of the TESLA stock price (o < 1) and penalised for a positive devel-
opment. In the interest of fairness, if the stock price e.g. doubles (o = 2), the buy
rater should get the same reward as a sell rater if the stock price halves (o = 1/2).
A natural choice for fPE that satisfies these requirements and is also bounded is
fPE(o, s) =
2c
pi
⋅ sgn(o − 1) ⋅ arctan(max{o − 1, o−1 − 1}) ⋅ g(s),
where g(buy) = 1 and g(sell) = −1. Note that arctan has the appealing properties of
being approximately linear around 0, strictly monotone increasing but still bounded
by pi/2. Thus for small price changes
fPE(o,buy) ≈
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
c(o − 1), o ≥ 1
−c(o−1 − 1), o < 1
and similarly fPE(o, sell) ≈ −c(o − 1) for o ≥ 1 and fPE(o, sell) ≈ c(o−1 − 1) for o < 1.
Owing to monotonicity, higher (sentiment aligned) performance results in higher
rewards. As in the previous examples, the reward pool is 10,000 ⋅ c. The maximal
possible penalty is −c and thus only (1 − c)T tokens are returned after tallying.
7 We can identify the sell rating with [0,1) ∈ P(O) and the buy rating with (1,∞) ∈ P(O).
6
3. Incentives and vulnerability analysis
In this section, we analyse the incentives for pollsters and sentiment providers to use
the Sentiment Protocol. We distinguish between public polls and polls amongst ex-
perts. We also explain its advantages over current (centralized) polling mechanisms
and discuss possible vulnerabilities.
3.1. Benefits of using blockchain technology
Firstly, it is important to note that opinion polling is not a truly decentralized
mechanism and in particular the Sentiment Protocol does not claim to be fully de-
centralized. Nonetheless, using blockchain technology offers important advantages
over classical, completely centralized, solutions. For the Sentiment Protocol, the
two most important properties of blockchain technology are:
1. the ability to easily transact and store value without the need of trusting a
third party and
2. the ability to immutably store data.
The Sentiment Protocol uses 1 for both the staking and the rewards/penalties. In a
centralized system, users are hesitant to commit a significant value for period of time
(≥∆T0) for the chance of receiving a comparatively small reward. Furthermore, by
additionally using 2, the submitted sentiment is immutably stored and the user can
easily prove that he is entitled to receive a reward - which may be far ahead in the
future (cf. Example 5 and Appendix A).
3.2. Public polls
The goal of a company conducting public polls is to receive reliable sentiment from
a large number of users. The users on the other hand wish to be rewarded for
providing accurate information. In the following we describe a possible setup of the
Sentiment Protocol to align their interests.
To ensure the diversity of sentiment providers, the polling company issues their
own token called POLL which can be arbitrarily transferred to and from polling
smart contracts but cannot be transferred between users. However, all earned re-
wards are freely transferable. Further, we assume that at most times there are
several polls to chose from and that each user has a starting balance of 100 POLL.
The performance evaluation function fPE is chosen positive (i.e. no penalties) and
the cool down period ∆T0 is one week. Due to this long cool-down period, POLL
holders are incentivized to participate in polls where they feel most confident in
predicting the result. Unless they have absolute certainty that their prediction is
correct, they are also incentivized to diversify their tokens on several polls. If how-
ever, they (think that they) are absolutely certain about the outcome, they may be
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3.3 Experts opinions
inclined to stake all their POLL tokens on a single event. Of course, such behaviour
is also in the interest of the polling company.
3.3. Experts opinions
The goal of the polling company is to receive high quality predictions. However, in
contrast to public polls, the users (experts) may wish to demonstrate their commit-
ment to a forecast by putting their own capital at risk and thus earn credibility.
Since the users have an interest in demonstrating credibility, the polling company
chooses a performance evaluation function with penalties. Since each submission
of sentiment may result in a loss of value, the company can simply choose ETH as
a staking token. A sentiment provider that feels more certain about a prediction
will choose to stake more tokens than a provider who is not as certain. As in the
previous case, this behaviour is in the interest of the polling company.
3.4. Limitations and possible vulnerabilities
An important limitation of blockchains is their inability to source external infor-
mation. Thus, in order to determine rewards, users needs to rely on oracles. This
problem is not specific to the Sentiment Protocol but poses a general problem in
developing truly decentralized applications. Another important limitation of smart
contract platforms is their high cost for computations. Thus, the cost for determin-
ing performance based rewards may be significant.
If these general limitations of blockchains can be overcome (or are irrelevant as
in Example 4) and if the incentive structure in the Sentiment Protocol is set up
correctly, it is impossible for the pollster or the user to illegitimately receive funds.
Owing to currently having these limitations, the polling company may act in a
much more centralized manner and may chose to conduct the rewards calculations
off-chain with data provided by regular (centralized) data-feeds. Of course, this
special role allows the pollster to illegitimately keep rewards. However, due to
the public availability of the provided sentiment and the performance evaluation
function, cheating by the pollster can easily be proven and the polling company will
quickly loose credibility. Thus, cheating by the company becomes unprofitable in
the long run.
To consider possible cheating from the users perspective it is convenient to distin-
guish between performance evaluation function with and without penalties. If no
penalties are possible then a user has no risk of loss. However, even if the pollster
does not use a custom token as detailed in Section 3.2, the commitment of huge
amounts of tokens is on the one hand very costly and on the other hand only prof-
itable if the predictions are right in the end. Furthermore, if the token is native to
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the polling company, amassing large amounts makes the user a major stakeholder
of the company and thus any misbehaviour counterproductive.
If penalties are possible and if potential rewards/penalties are sufficiently large,
it may be advisable to choose a ‘zero-sum’ performance evaluation function, i.e.
there should not exist a combination of sentiments and staking choices such that
the sentiment provider earns a profit independent of the outcome. Of course, as
in the case without penalties, it is at the discretion of the pollster to allow this
possibility.
4. Use cases
In this section we discuss two specific use cases. We will not discuss the two cases
in full details but rather assume familiarity with Section 2.
4.1. Governance
Any token that is able to access smart contract functionality (e.g. ERC-20 tokens)
can use the Sentiment Protocol for decentralized governance. Since policy changes
are not objectively verifiable as right or wrong, it is natural to chose a constant
performance evaluation function fPE ≡ c (cf. Example 4). Thus, each token holder
that participates in the governance process gets a fixed reward for his engagement.
The required reward pool can be provided by the token issuing company. To ensure
an indefinite supply of reward pools Ri for the ith voting event, the company can
e.g. use a distribution according to a geometric series. That is, if the company
plans on using 100,000 tokens for incentivizing governance participation (via the
Sentiment Protocol), they can set Ri+1 = x ⋅Ri, where x < 1 and
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R1 = 100,000 ⋅ (1 − x). (1)
Since the performance evaluation function is independent of the outcome, neither
oracles nor complex computations are necessary and thus the (governance) Sen-
timent Protocol can be entirely implemented on-chain. In particular, this allows
running decentralized autonomous organization, where user are allowed to vote on
policy changes and decisions are automatically executed according to the voting
results.
4.2. Community driven rating agency
In this scenario, the polling company wishes to regularly receive sentiment on the
performance expectations of a wide range of stocks. To ensure broad reach, the
8 Indeed, ∑∞i=1Ri = 100,000 (1 − x)∑
∞
i=0
xi = 100,000 (1 − x) 1
1−x
= 100,000.
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4.2 Community driven rating agency
polling company issues 1,000,000 custom tokens of which 900,000 are distributed
to the public and 100,000 are held by the company to fund reward pools. The
transferability of originally distributed tokens between users is limited (e.g. only
10% per quarter). However, earned rewards can be transferred freely. To ensure
the indefinite supply of rewards pools, the company chooses x = 0.99 = 99% (cf. (1))
and thus the reward pool for the first sentiment round is R1 = 1000 tokens and each
subsequent pool is 99% of the size of the previous pool. In each round the users are
asked to provide their sentiment on the performance of 10 different stocks within
the next three months (∆T1 = 3 months) by choosing between ⇑, ⇔ and ⇓ for each
stock.
⇓
⇔
⇑
0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
0.5
1
o
f
P
E
/c
Figure 2: The performance evaluation function fPE for the three sentiments ⇓, ⇔
and ⇑. The red curve indicates the function o↦ fPE(o,⇓), the blue curve
the function o↦ fPE(o,⇔) and the green curve the function o↦ fPE(o,⇑
). Lines not shown correspond to fPE = 0.
The performance evaluation function is defined by fPE(o,⇑) = cmin{1,max{0, o−
1}}, fPE(o,⇓) = cmin{1,max{0,1/o− 1}} and
fPE(o,⇔) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
5c(1.1− 1/o) o ∈ [0.90,1],
5c(1.1− o) o ∈ [1,1.1],
0 otherwise.
Thus, a ⇑-rater gets rewarded only for positive stock performance and his reward is
linear in the performance with a cap at 100%. A⇔-rater receives a maximal payout
if the stock price does not change and does not get rewarded if the performance is
outside the interval (0.90,1.1). See Figure 2 for a plot of this function. We note
that the performance evaluation function only takes non-negative values and thus
there is no risk of loss for participants. In particular, participation in the poll does
not involve gambling.
Since the reward pool is 1000 tokens and 900,000 tokens are held by the sentiment
providers we set c = 1000/(10 ⋅900,000) = 0.0001. By allowing the rating of 10 stocks
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simultaneously, users are incentivized to prioritize stocks (by staking more tokens)
that they feel most confident in making a good prediction.
The obtained sentiment data is a valuable asset to the company and could for
instance be sold to third parties or used to create a community driven portfolio.
In the latter case, the community itself would have the chance to invest in such a
portfolio and thus double their incentive to participate in the rating process.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how the Sentiment Protocol can leverage blockchain
technology to align the incentives of pollsters and sentiment contributors. We dis-
cussed several use cases including decentralized governance and prediction markets.
By introducing a fixed performance evaluation function we are able to reward pre-
dictions finely graduated. We have shown how such an approach offers a clear
advantage over classical polling solutions, where rewards are either non-existing or
small and independent of the quality of the contributed sentiment, and also over
classical prediction markets, which are considered illegal in most jurisdictions.
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A. Sentiment protocol with multiple performance
evaluations
∆T3
Sentiment Contribution Tallying 1. PE 2. PE
User
∆T0 ∆T1 ∆T2
stake (partially) return stake 1. reward 2. reward
Figure 3: Overview of Sentiment Protocol (with penalties) with long term rewards.
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To incentivize users to provide sentiment on long term performance (e.g. stock
prices), we extend the protocol to allow several performance evaluations (cf. Fig-
ure 3). Let us illustrate this by assuming that the performance is evaluated every
three months, i.e. ∆Ti = 3 months. To this end, we can e.g. define the performance
evaluation function fPEi at the ith performance evaluation as
fPEi = 2
−ifPE,
where fPE is the original (single event) performance evaluation function. Since
∑
∞
i=1 2
−i = 1, the reward pool does not need to be increased. Of course, the pollster
is free to make different choices for fPEi. The only restriction is that the reward
pool needs to be big enough to cover all performance evaluations.
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